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ARTICLES
THE ASIAN CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
by DAVID P. FIDLER*
Predictions that the 2 1 t century will be the "Asian century" have sparked analytical interest
from many disciplines but not international law. This article focuses on what implications "Asia
rising" may have for international law in the 21"t century. The article begins by looking at the
19 th and 2 0th centuries as the European and American centuries respectively to assess the impact
these centuries made on international law. The article then analyses possible meanings for an
Asian century and frames such a century's implications for international law around the concept
of a "Concert of Asia". The article argues that, through a Concert of Asia, Asian nations have
the opportunity to make the region a laboratory for global governance that determines the next
stage of international law's historical development as an instrument in human governance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Predictions that the 21 s' century will be the "Asian century" have been made for years,1 and
such predictions have strengthened and suffered as Asia and the rest of the international
system have experienced dramatic events and change. The "Asian century" debate waxed
and waned, for example, before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. For all its
ups and downs, the notion that this century will find Asia attracting more world attention
has shown remarkable resilience, largely because the importance of Asia in international
relations continues to grow.
The phenomenon of "Asia rising" has drawn scrutiny from experts who study the geopo-
litical balance of power, trends in military strength, threats to national and international
security, economic growth and competition, the processes of globalisation, and even public
health. Missing from the discourse on the rise of Asia's prominence is the analysis of the
implications for international law of this rise in Asia's importance. 2 This article attempts
B.A. (University of Kansas); M.Phil. in International Relations (Oxon); J.D. (Harv); BCL (Oxon). Professor of
Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law.
Analysis on the 2 1 '
t 
century being the Asian century appears to have gained prominence first in the late 1980s
and continued into the 1990s. See, e.g., J. Weiss, The Asian Century: The Economic Ascent of the Pacific Rim
and What It Means for the West (New York: Facts on File, 1989); W. L. Rivers Black III, "Maritime Arbitration
in the Asian Century" (1990) 14 Tul. Mar. L.J. 261; K. W. Abbott & G. W. Bowman, "Economic Integration
for the Asian Century: An Early Look at New Approaches" (1994) 4 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 187;
C. Lingle, The Rise & Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global Millennium (Hong
Kong: Asia 2000 Ltd., 1997); S. Sanders, ed., The U.S. Role in the Asian Century (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1997). The earliest published reference to "Asian century" I found appears in J. Romein, The
Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia, trans. by R. T. Clark (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1962).
2 The Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law sponsored a symposium in 2001 that explored
"the challenges confronting the teaching and practice of international law in Asia." ("From the Editors" (2001)
5 S.J.I.C.L. ix). The essays in this symposium did not, however, directly address the implications of the growth
in the power and importance of the region for Asia's relationship with international law that is the mainstay of
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to address this gap in "Asian century" analysis by speculating-hopefully in an educated
way-about what impact such a century might have on international law.
I undertake this endeavor with awareness of the pitfalls of engaging in this kind of "crystal
ball" analysis. One could argue that speculating about how an Asian century might affect
the theory and practice of international law is dubious on at least three fronts. First, the
idea of an Asian century is itself controversial, 3 meaning that even the first step in exploring
this topic presents problems. Second, the various political, economic, and technological
forces and trends that many believe point to an increasingly prominent Asia in international
relations are complex and fluid, rendering the ground that needs to be covered in the analysis
proposed in this article unstable. Third, a century is a long time, making it problematic to
predict about what will happen over such an expanse of time. Fourth, asking what impact
an Asian century might have on international law invites analysis to dig below surface
phenomena in order to explore the forces that shape international law. Such theoretical and
philosophical examination of international law is itself fraught with controversies that are
decades, if not centuries, old.
The dangers of the type of analysis I undertake in this article are, however, worth risking
because the evidence of Asia's growing prominence in world affairs is too clear to ignore.
Other disciplines are readily braving the difficult challenge of peering into the murky future
from a vantage point that is shifting and changing rapidly. Whether we like it or not,
international lawyers are being swept along by the historic shift underway in international
relations that is making Asia more important to the future of global affairs. We might as
well pause in the midst of all the exciting and worrying tasks international lawyers face
today to contemplate where history is taking us as Asia rises.
My analysis comprises three substantive parts. First, I look back at the 1 9 th and 2 0 th
centuries as the "European century" and "American century" respectively and consider what
these centuries meant for international law. The European century and the American century
both had significant impacts on international law. An understanding of these impacts will
provide the background against which informed speculation about what the Asian century
might mean for international law can proceed.
Second, I consider what the term "Asian century" means. How we think about an Asian
century may differ from why we call the 1 9 th century "European" and the 2 0th century
"American". Asia's growing prominence in international affairs may not signal the rise of
a region, or of a single great power, that will project its influence in all corners of the world,
as the Europeans did in the 1 9 th century and the United States did in the 2 0 th century. The
coming of the Asian century might not mean that Asia is the main actor; it might mean it is
the main geographical location in which the reigning and rising great powers face off and
in which the next stage of global governance takes shape.
Third, I frame the implications of an Asian century for international law around the
concept of a "Concert of Asia". In this article, I use the Concert of Asia idea to attempt
to capture the need for Asian countries to understand that the growth in Asia's power
and prominence creates opportunities and burdens that Asian countries will only maximise
and manage effectively through a strategic approach to global governance. I envision the
Concert of Asia as providing a framework through which Asian countries can build on
"Asian century" analyses. Some contributions to the symposium framed the future of Asia's relationship with
international law as one of renewed resistance to outside intervention and pressure. See, e.g., M. Sornarajah,
"The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of Globalization" (2001)5 S.J.I.C.L 285 at 313. ("There
is a need to confront them [economic liberalism and its concomitants] by maintaining vigorous opposition to
the norms preferred by the powerful states. The Asian perspective that was devised in the post-colonial context
must be kept alive in order to ensure that the interests of the weaker Asian states are safeguarded.") My article
argues that looking backwards at the history of Asian resistance to international legal realities in the 20, h century
will not suffice as a guide to Asia's relationship with international law in a century in which the Asian region
will become more important to the political and economic dynamics of international relations.
1. Buruma, "What Happened to the Asian Century?" New York Times (29 December 1999) A25 ("The idea of
an Asian century is in itself absurd. 'Asia' is too big, too vague and too diverse to serve as a useful concept.").
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existing cooperative mechanisms to make Asia a laboratory of global governance in the
21 s' century. Through a Concert of Asia, Asian nations have the chance to create a new
legal and governance order unlike anything seen before in international relations.
II. OF CENTURIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Talk of an "Asian century" partakes of a tradition of associating centuries (or long periods
of time) with regions or particular countries that left permanent marks during the respective
eras in question.4 Experts often refer to the 1 9th century as the "European century" because,
during this time, the great powers of Europe, especially Great Britain, dominated the world
politically, militarily, economically, and technologically. Similarly, the rise of the United
States to great power, superpower, and then hyperpower-hegemony in the 2 0th century made
this century "American" because of the impact the United States had during this time on
world affairs. In this part, I consider what marks the European century and the American
century left on international law. Understanding these impacts may provide some analytical
signposts for thinking about the implications of an Asian century for international law.
A. The European Century: The Universalisation of International Law
Towards the end of the 1 8th century, the philosopher-parliamentarian Edmund Burke
referred to the law of nations as the "public law of Europe". 5 Burke's connection of the law
of nations with the geographical, historical, and cultural region called Europe was accurate
because the origins of modern international law are European. Europe gave birth to what
Burke called the law of nations, and Jeremy Bentham called international law, in the late
1 8 th century. During the course of the European century, what for Burke represented a set
of rules for relations among European nations became the set of rules regulating the inter-
actions of countries around the entire world. The European century's most distinctive mark
on international law was its universalisation as an instrument of international governance.
The universalisation of international law was a by-product of European imperialism and
other forms of European projection of superior power in non-European parts of the world.
In essence, the global expansion of European influence, control and domination brought
much of the world into the system of sovereign states-the Westphalian system-that had
been the foundation for international relations in Europe since at least 1648. Once within the
system, countries or regions under direct or indirect European dominion found themselves
subjected to the international law that formed part of the governance machinery of the
Westphalian system.
Europe's universalisation of international law involved more than expanding the geo-
graphical reach of the law of nations. Universalisation of international law also involved a
process of Europeanisation for the non-European parts of the world. Through the "standard
of civilisation", European countries applied international law in a manner that required non-
European nations to conform their governments, laws and policies to European concepts,
models, approaches and interests. 6 Elsewhere, I have referred to this process as creating a
global "Westphalian civilization".' The nature of the expansion of European power imbued
4 W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. by M. Byers (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000) at
137-572 (analysing the international legal order in the Spanish (1494-1648), French (1648-1815), and British
(1815-1919) ages.).
5 D. P. Fidler & J. M. Welsh, "Burke and the Theory of International Relations" in D. P. Fidler & J. M. Welsh,
eds., Empire and Community: Edmund Burke's Writings and Speeches on International Relations (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1999) 37 at 44.
6 See generally G. Gong, The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984).
7 D. P. Fidler, "Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future
Direction of International Law" (2003) 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 29 at 34.
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international law with cultural and racial prejudices that operated as part of the interna-
tional legal machinery. Burke's association of the law of nations with European culture in
the late 1 8 th century became, over the course of the 1 9 th century, a defining feature of the
system of international law that operated on a global, not just a regional, basis.
European power and civilisational ideology thus defined the scope and nature of inter-
national law in the 1 9 th century. Neither Europe's material power nor its ideology of
superiority faced serious challenges in the non-European world, which allowed the European
great powers, led by Great Britain, to impose a governance structure for international rela-
tions on the rest of the world modelled on the European experience. Although Japan
managed to transform itself into a European-type regional power by the end of the 1 9 th
and beginning of the 2 0 th centuries, Japan's rise occurred within the parameters set by the
universalisation of international law and did not constitute a fundamental challenge to the
system.
The century of European dominance over international relations and international law
ended because the balance of power within Europe did not hold, sweeping all the major
players of the European century into World War I, a bloody conflict that destroyed the
superiority of European power and the ideology of European superiority. The universal
governance system created by the expansion of European international law lost its directing
hand and its ideological animus. The 2 0 th century witnessed power and ideological struggles
that would buffet and shape international law as profoundly as had the ascendancy and
expansion of Europe in the 1 9 th century.
B. The American Century: The Triumph of Ideology in International Law
Many regard the 2 0 th century as the American century, predominantly because the United
States' rise to the status of lone superpower in international politics occurred during this
period of time. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s
and early 1990s left the United States as the dominant country politically, economically,
militarily, technologically and culturally. From the vantage point of the United States'
victory in the Cold War and its resulting hegemony, the 2 0 th century certainly takes on an
American sheen.
The story of the American century is, however, different from the tale of the expansion
of European power and dominance in the 19 th century; and the differences are important
for understanding the impressions the American century left on international law. The
United States emerged as the dominant player in international relations over the course of a
century marked by deep ideological controversy and conflict. The implosion of the ideology
of European superiority that fueled the expansion of European influence and the system
of international law was followed by successive attempts by various countries to impose
an ideological imprint on national and international governance. These ideological clashes
affected international law much more deeply than the European "standard of civilization"
did in the 1 9 th century.
The 2 0 th century became a battlefield of "-isms" from which international law did not
escape. In the wake of the disaster of World War I, the United States, through Presi-
dent Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, laid down a philosophical framework on which
the nations of the world would build a post-war "structure of international justice" as the
"moral climax of this culminating and final war for human liberty". 8 This vision pro-
moted liberalism's principles of the self-determination of peoples, transparent governance
President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, online: Brigham Young University, Harold B.
Lee Library <http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html> (last visited 8 March 2005).
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and diplomacy, free trade among nations, and the building of international institutions to
ensure the collective security of strong and weak states.
9
Other ideologies rose to challenge President Wilson's vision, including fascism, commu-
nism and the anti-imperialism of the non-aligned movement of developing countries. The
1 9 th century saw European countries struggle against each other for imperial dominion
around the globe, but the major players shared the common ideology of European superi-
ority and consensus on the need to force non-European nations to become "civilised" for
international law to apply fully to their foreign relations. After tensions between the states
of the Holy Alliance and Great Britain at the end of the Napoleonic wars eased, ideolog-
ical matters did not seriously affect relations among the great powers and their use and
understanding of international law. This underlying ideological solidarity helps explain
why positivism prevailed over natural law as the theoretical basis for obligations arising
under international law in the 1 9 th century.
In the 2 0th century, however, ideologies affected international politics at every level:
imperialists versus anti-imperialists, communists versus fascists, liberals versus fascists, cap-
italists versus communists, and the search by some countries for a "third way" between
the dominant ideologies represented by the United States and the Soviet Union. The like-
mindedness of the European great powers in the 1 9 th century is not a feature of 2 0 th century
relations among the most important states in the international system. Ideological pluralism
in the 2 0 th century forced virtually every feature of international law to undergo theoretical
and practical scrutiny from multiple angles (e.g., Western, Soviet, Third World), creating
a disconcerting kaleidoscope effect that gave international law an alluring but gossamer
presence in international relations.
For international law, the 2 0 th century became an "ideological inquisition" that affected
not only the substantive content of the law but also the way in which states and inter-
national lawyers approached the law. The triumph of ideology in international law in
the 2 0 th century occurred largely through the impact of this inquisition on the nature of
international legal analysis. The century began with ambitions for the development of the
"science" of international law,10 which reflected the continued momentum of 1 9 th century
thinking. 1 Instead, in the 2 0th century, international law became "political science", a dis-
cipline with certain technical aspects (e.g., treaties, customary international law) integrated
into competing systems of political thought and practice.
1 2
The United States was not solely responsible for the ideological inquisition of international
law in the 2 0 th century; but it was, by virtue of its status as a key great power and its
approach to international relations, a leading inquisitor. With Wilson's Fourteen Points,
the United States set the tone for the rest of the century in terms of embedding international
law and its development into a larger philosophical construct for international affairs. The
Wilsonian project both required international law and demanded its radical transformation,
echoing the 1 8th century criticisms of existing international law (e.g., Grotius and Vattel
as "miserable comforters") and the alternative liberal vision of the philosopher, Immanuel
Kant.1 3
The ideological inquisition of international law in the 2 0 th century involved not only bat-
tles between the big "-isms" but also controversies about the "ideology of international law".
I Ibid.
10 See, e.g., Lassa Oppenheim, "The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method" (1908) 2 A.J.I.L. 313.
11 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of Modern International Law 1870-1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 40-41 (noting the ambitions of the founders of the Institut
de droit international to create an institution for "collective scientific activity in international law").
12 The increased use of international relations theory as part of the analytical tool set of international lawyers
illustrates the extent to which international law became embedded in larger systems of political thought and
practice during the 20th century.
13 On Kant's thinking, see H. Williams & K. Booth, "Kant: Theorist Beyond Limits" in I. Clark & I. B. Neumann,
eds., Classical Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) at 71.
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One intriguing consequence of the constant framing of international law through political
ideologies was the emergence of international law as an ideology itself. This phenomenon is
seen in the backlash against international law and international legalism mounted by realist
thinkers in the inter-war and post-World War II periods.14 The backlash was particularly
prominent concerning debates about American post-World War II foreign policy as diplo-
mats and scholars tried to steer the United States away from the legalism that many believe
prevailed in the inter-war years to the detriment of security and order in the international
system.
As a nation, in Abraham Lincoln's words, "dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal", 1 5 the United States lacked the ability to divorce ideology from power politics,
which meant that the American approach to international law flowed from its commitment
to ideepolitik. Fittingly, the Soviet Union was, in many respects, a state dedicated to its own
philosophical propositions, such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat",16 that made it a
formidable opponent to the United States in the ideological inquisition of international law.
Developing countries emerging from colonisation attempted, to varying degrees of success,
to construct their own worldviews and to use them to challenge and, if possible, change
international law.17
What I call the "triumph of ideology" in international law in the 2 0 th century is not,
therefore, a product of any one country or bloc of states. Ideepolitik grooved international
legal analysis to accommodate international law's integration into larger, competing ideo-
logical constructs. This grooving meant that international law became not only relevant but
also critical to ideological expositions on the relationships among citizens within a state,
between citizens and their government, between citizens of different states, and between
governments. Ideepolitik made international law conceptually and practically instrumental
not only to the traditional concerns of horizontal governance among sovereign states but
also the previously off-limits issues involving vertical governance within such states.
Specifically, the triumph of ideology in international law riddled the conventional prin-
ciple against non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states with holes, through
which poured new concepts and rules of international law directly connected with different
ideological concepts of good governance. Although often the source of intense frustra-
tion (and sometimes despair) for international lawyers, the ideological inquisition actually
vastly increased the governance terrain on which international law could and did operate.
This dynamic connects to the post-World War II rise in international law of issues involving
self-determination of peoples under colonial oppression, the protection of human rights, lib-
eralised and non-discriminatory trade among nations, and redistributive equity and justice
among the rich and poor (e.g., the New International Economic Order).
Again, not all this ferment in international law flowed from the behaviour of the United
States. The triumph of ideology in international law in the 2 0 th century is a development
produced by the entire international system engaging in the ideological inquisition of the
law of nations. The 2 0 th century is, nevertheless, the American century because the United
States proved superior at engaging in ideepolitik. By the last decade of the century, all
major ideological challenges to the United States' world view during the 2 0 th century lay
scattered on the ash heap of history-the racial, civilisational and imperial prejudices of the
14 Two well-known and influential critiques of legalism in international politics are E. H. Carr, The Twenty-
Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan and
Company, 1939) and H. J. Morgenthan, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed.
rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).
15 Abraham Lincoln, "Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania" in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859-
1865 (Washington, D.C.: Library of America, 1989) at 536.
16 V. Lenin, "State and Revolution" in A. P. Mendel, ed., Essential Works of Marxism (New York: Bantam,
1979) at 101, 171.
17 Sornarajah, supra note 2 at 291-294 (analysing the developing world's "phase of resistance" against prevailing
international law).
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European great powers; fascism; communism; and the various "-isms" that emerged from
the developing world during the period of decolonisation.
The triumph of ideology in international law that characterised the 2 0 th century does not
mean that international law now aligns, or will always align, with American perspectives or
that the United States will always prevail in ideepolitik. Indeed, many controversies arising
in the American-led "war on terrorism" involve American actions, such as the treatment of
detained persons, which many perceive to be in tension with the bodies of international law
the United States had championed in the 2 0 th century. The universalisation of international
law achieved by European hegemony in the 1 9th century continued undiminished when
that hegemony collapsed during and after World War I. The ideological inquisition has
not, in other words, reached the "end of history" because this inquisition has become, like
universalisation, part of the DNA of international law, the genetic code transmitted to the
generation of international law that will develop in the 21 s" century.
III. THE ASIAN CENTURY: POSSIBLE MEANINGS
When commentators talk about the 21" century being the "Asian century", they use this
moniker in diverse and often rather loose ways, making it difficult to determine whether any
consensus exists as to what an Asian century would be. The common ground for most, if not
all, of the Asian century discourse is the perception and prediction that Asia's importance in
international relations will grow significantly in the 21 s' century. 18 These predictions build
on the rise in Asia's importance in global affairs as seen in the last decade of the 2 0 th century.
To speculate on what implications an Asian century would have on international law, we
need to spend some time thinking about the potential meanings of an Asian century. This
part explores ways of interpreting what an Asian century might involve.
A. What is "Asia"?
Literature on the growing significance of Asia in international politics does not always refer
to the same "Asia". For some, Asia means East Asia, especially China, Japan, Taiwan,
and the Korean peninsula. Others talk of Asia more broadly, as encompassing East and
Southeast Asia, stretching from Burma in the west to Japan in the east, and Russia in the
north to Australia in the south. A third perspective stretches Asia from India in the west to
Japan in the east and everything in between.
Plotting the exact geographical parameters of "Asia" is not, however, critical for pur-
poses of an Asian century analysis. The term "European" in the European century was
loosely used as well and referred not comprehensively to the geographical area of Europe
but to the geographical location of states that dominated international relations politically,
militarily, technological and economically. Likewise, Asia is a term of art for the poten-
tial for countries in the broadly defined Asian region to transform global affairs. The most
important countries in this potential transformation are China and India, with many experts
predicting that, of these two, China will be the more significant actor in the 21" century.
B. Asia as a Hegemonic Region?
One possible interpretation of the Asian century is to see it as mirroring the European century
in that certain countries in Asia, such as China and India, will rise so prominently in power
18 Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project-Mapping the Global Future (Washington, D.C.:
National Intelligence Council, 2004) at 48-51 analyses the rise of Asia.
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and influence that they can impose their will on the rest of the international system. Instead
of Europeanisation, the world would experience an unprecedented Asianisation, as defined
by the great Asian powers. This interpretation is, however, neither realistic nor desirable.
First, to believe that China and India would approach the kind of domination European
states had in the 1 9 th century would require predicting that (1) the current hegemony exer-
cised by the United States utterly vanishes; (2) the power and influence still retained by
Europe (as evidenced by the continued expansion eastward of the European Union) also dis-
sipates to the point where the political units of this region are deeply vulnerable to Chinese
and Indian power; and (3) that China and India both resolve their significant internal politi-
cal and economic problems to allow for global political adventurism on the scale undertaken
by the European great powers in the 1 9 th century.
At most, the literature debating the rise of Asia contains predictions that the power of the
United States and Europe decreases relative to the growing power of China and India; but
I have not seen any expert argue that the enormous influence that the United States and the
European countries still possess will evaporate in the 21st century to the point of creating a
political vacuum for Chinese and Indian power to fill. The universalisation of international
law during the European century depended on an imbalance of power between Europe and
non-European regions that will not, in all likelihood, be a characteristic of an Asian century.
Second, the idea that "the sun will never set" on Chinese and Indian dominion over
international affairs ignores or evades the reality that China and India would only be able
to achieve such dominion through significant levels of diplomatic, economic, political and
military conflict. In the 19th century, European countries rarely hesitated to present the
standard of civilisation to non-European peoples at the point of a bayonet. Nothing in the
current development of China and India suggests that these rising powers would desire to
project their power globally through the strong-arm tactics used in the Europeanisation of
international relations in the 1 9 th century.
For these reasons, the Asian century will not mirror the European century in terms of its
impact on international politics. China and India will not make the Asian region hegemonic
in the way Europe was in the 1 9 th century.
C. An Asian Hegemon a la Uncle Sam?
The second model, based on the American century, is for one Asian power to prevail against
all competitors to become the dominant global political, economic, cultural and military
force. Talk of an Asian century, not a Chinese or Indian century, already suggests that few,
if any, experts believe that the American century model provides insight for 21 s' century
international politics-except in the sense that the United States continues throughout this
century to be hegemonic. The lack of predictions concerning a Chinese or Indian century
indicates that geopolitical forecasters do not believe that either China or India will evolve
over the course of the next century into the kind of hyper-power the United States became
at the end of the 2 0 th century.
One reason why experts do not predict that China or India will replace the United States as
the dominant great power in the 21 s' century is that they do not believe that the United States'
power and influence will wither to the point that the United States is clearly subordinate to
either Asian country. This outcome is not impossible-recall Britain's precipitous fall from
the zenith of its global imperial power at the beginning of the 2 0 th century to its status as a
"poodle power" of the United States at the end.
Scholars have in the past included the United States in analyses of the "rise and fall of the
great powers", 19 indicating that the decline of the United States from its current position
19 See, e.g., P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) at 514-535.
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of power could indeed happen. But scrutiny of whether the United States' power declines
typically goes no farther than discussing how much US influence will decline relative to the
increase in the power of other countries, such as China. For China or India to emerge as
the global hegemon, as the United States did at the end of the 2 0th century, the decline in
US power would have to be more dramatic, even cataclysmic. Britain suffered cataclysmic
events that gutted its global influence-two world wars within the space of twenty years.
Again, this possibility could unfold for the United States. However, the probability of such
an absolute decline in US power in the 21" century remains extremely low, particularly in
light of the fact that experts do not believe that serious armed conflict between the great
powers is likely in the 21 s century.
20
Another reason why the American century model does not fit trends in Asia concerns the
triumph of ideology in international law that occurred in the 2 0 th century. This triumph
flowed from international relations becoming ideepolitik-competition among the great
powers in both ideas and material power. Neither China nor India appears poised to provide
the world with ideological contributions that fundamentally challenge the triumph of liberal
ideology in the wake of the end of the Cold War. India is the world's largest democracy and
is increasingly integrating its economy into global markets for goods and services, hardly
the platform for rejecting the dominant liberal template and presenting radically different
alternative bases for ideepolitik. In addition, India faces many internal problems in trying
to make its giant democracy and increasingly globalised economy function in an orderly and
effective manner. Such internal issues may force the Indian government to expend much
energy and resources at home rather than on projecting Indian influence abroad.
China maintains a precarious balance between remnants of communist rule in political
governance and an economy increasingly dancing to the tune of global capitalism. Images
from Tiananmen Square still haunt Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Like India, China
will have its hands full internally with ideology and will not be in a position to act as
ideological exemplar for the global village of the 21 s" century. This context makes it very
unlikely China will produce transformative ideological contributions of universal appeal in
international politics in the 21 s' century.
Further, one ideological fault line commentators on future global trends identify-that
between radical Islam and Americanised globalisation-may adversely affect Asia in the 21 "
century. Growth in radical Islamic sentiment among Asia's significant Muslim populations
could produce tension and conflict, particularly as Asian economies increasingly benefit from
and help advance globalisation. Asia could, thus, suffer "ideological drag" as opposed to
being a leader in 21t century ideepolitik.
D. An Asian Way to an Asian Century?
A third possible template for the Asian century would be for Asia as a region to develop its
own path to having transformative influence on international relations. This approach might
appeal to those who advocate the importance of "Asian values" and finding the "Asian way"
in contemporary world affairs. A number of problems arise, however, in thinking about
the development of a distinctive Asian spin on 21 st century international politics.
First, the "Asian way" intimates agreement among countries in "Asia" of the right "way"
to approach the challenges of the 21 st century. As explored earlier, what "Asia" means
geographically is itself controversial. The controversy expands when more nebulous and
culturally bound concepts of "values" feature in the debate. Are the "Asian values" pro-
moted in East Asia the same values India promotes? Do all roads to the "Asian way" lead
through Delhi or Beijing? The "Asian way" implies deep ideological and cultural solidarity
in Asia that does not in fact exist.
20 Supra note 18 at 98.
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However geographically defined, Asia does not share the kind of common political, eco-
nomic and cultural heritage that enabled Europe to establish a likemindedness it imposed
on the non-European world in the 19th century. Nor do Asian countries nations appear
fiercely dedicated to philosophical propositions in the way the United States and the Soviet
Union were in the 2 0th century. These observations do not mean that Asian countries and
cultures do not have characteristics that the rise of Asia may express more prominently in
globalisation, but they do mean that such characteristics are more likely to operate tactically
in reaction to events rather than strategically to proactively shape future developments. An
"Asian way" to an Asian century can only be strategic.
Even if conceivable, a strategic "Asian way" concept might contain seeds of darker forces
that have appeared in previous historical eras in other regions and countries. Conceptu-
alising an Asian way involves, to some extent, a process of inclusion and exclusion, of
differentiation, that takes place through the exercise of superior power. The standard of
civilisation in international law represented a European process of inclusion and exclusion
that operated on the dynamics provided by the disequilibrium of power between European
and non-European countries. The peculiar nature of the US relationship with international
politics has led to assertions of "American exceptionalism", a kind of global manifest des-
tiny for the unique American "empire of liberty". Or, to paraphrase President Bush, you're
either for us or against us.
The danger in Asia of a strategic "Asian way" is not perhaps the development of a
universalisable inclusion/exclusion process (as the Europeans and Americans developed in
their respective centuries) but of the increase in nationalism in respective Asian countries
that could complicate regional and global diplomacy. Some experts have observed with
concern growing nationalism in China and Japan as China continues to rise as a regional and
international political and economic power.2 1 Such tensions in Sino-Japanese relations not
only diminish prospects for a more unified Asian perspective but also threaten to undermine
the political and economic conditions that might make the 21 st century an Asian century.
E. Asia Among Others? Competitors for Century Naming Rights
Although many focus on Asia as the "next big thing" in global politics, some brief words
on the existence of other possible scenarios for the 21 s' century are in order. The foremost
competitor for naming-rights concerning the 21 s century will be the United States. The 2 1st
century could be the Second American Century given the influence the United States will
retain, and perhaps augment, as the 21' t century unfolds. The bold, but dangerous, attempt
by the United States to transform the Middle East into a region receptive to, and adept at,
democracy and free markets could prevail, enhancing both the United States' material and
ideological power. The continued expansion of the principles of liberalised trade, whether
through the growth of membership in the World Trade Organization or the crafting of
regional and bilateral trade agreements, could further entrench American predominance in
structuring the global economy. Further, at present, the United States appears to be the only
great power able and willing to throw its weight around in international politics to achieve
policy objectives, no matter how much such behaviour exasperates other countries. The US
ability to project its power in this way may increase over the course of the 21 t century.
The growth in the membership of the European Union witnessed in 2004 potentially
makes it a competitor for 21 s century naming-rights. Solidification of this growth, and its
continuance, could make the European Union and its member states more influential on
the world stage. Such influence would arise not only from the size of its economic market
21 See, e.g., D. J. Lynch, "Animosity Toward Japan is Again the Rage in China: Past Brutality, Modern Disputes
Feeding Nationalist Movement" USA Today (24 February 2005) 08A. The large anti-Japanese protests in China
during April 2005 underscore concerns about the rise of nationalism in both China and Japan.
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but also the type of quasi-federal governance dynamic EU member states have painstakingly
developed. The EU governance approach may offer more traction for global problems
experienced by other regions in the 21 s' century than traditional, state-centric forms of
international governance.
A final possibility is that the 21" century will be the century of the non-state actor-
multi-national companies, non-governmental organisations, technological entrepreneurs,
organised criminal gangs, drug and sex-trade traffickers and terrorists. The European and
American centuries were, without question, state-centric centuries. Although non-state
actors were active participants in international affairs, the great powers still ran the show
in conventional command-and-control ways. The phenomenon of globalisation has height-
ened the attention paid to the importance and impact of non-state actors on global politics,
and most predictions about the 21 st century foresee the acceleration of globalisation. This
dynamic may produce a situation in which states are constantly struggling to catch up
with, and clean up after, non-state actors' exploitation of globalised identities and interests,
technologies, and transportation networks.
The governance problem of security illustrates the potential for the 21 st century to be
the non-state actor century. International and national security in the 1 9th and 2 0 th cen-
turies revolved almost exclusively around states and their relative military, political and
economic power. Many so-called "new security threats", such as terrorism, environmental
degradation, malevolent misappropriation of technologies (e.g., biotechnology), and infec-
tious diseases, are largely non-state actor driven and fall outside the traditional military
calculations of old-style realpolitik. The architecture for international and national security
built in the 2 0 th century (e.g., military alliances and the UN Security Council) does not
adequately accommodate the nature of the security threats emerging in the 21" century.
Recommendations by the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change that "comprehensive collective security" has to address not only traditional
conflict between states but also poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation, ter-
rorism and transnational organised crime22 provide some indication of how non-state actors
may drive the global agenda in the 21 s" century more than any one state or region.
IV. THE ASIAN CENTURY'S CALLING: TOWARD A CONCERT OF ASIA
A. Rise of Asia as a Governance Challenge
As explored above, an Asian century is not likely to involve Asia emerging as a hegemonic
region, nor does it appear that China or India will supplant the United States as the world's
hyperpower. The importance of an Asian century may be more diffuse and complex than
the stark characteristics of the European and American centuries. The rise of Asia makes
this region important to international politics because what happens in Asia in the 21"
century will have global implications. The region has already become an economic engine
for globalisation, and this role for Asia does not look likely to diminish in the next decades.
In addition, the growth of Indian, and in particular Chinese power, makes Asia the scene
for the next round of competition among the great powers.
These developments in Asia mean that the Asian century idea can be interpreted through
the lens of governance. Asia and the rest of the world face the task of successfully governing
Asia's rise in political, economic, technological, cultural and military importance in global
politics. How states in Asia and beyond handle this governance challenge will determine
22 Report of the Secretary- General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004). See also Report of the Secretary- General In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/ 2005, 21 March
2005.
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the Asian century's implications for international law. Failure to manage Asia's rise in
power and prominence in an orderly and peaceful manner will produce state and non-
state behaviour that does not conform to international law. Effective governance of Asia's
emergence will produce political conditions in which compliance with, and utilisation of,
international law proves fruitful.
Arguing that an Asian century presents a governance challenge reflects lessons learned
from previous centuries in international relations. The European and American centuries
ultimately concerned how international politics were governed. The universalisation of
international law in the 1 9 th century reflected the European effort to impose a Westphalian-
style governance template on non-European parts of the world. The American century
involved intense ideological and power struggles over which governance template would
determine the nature of politics and relations among states and peoples. These struggles
ended with the triumph of the American-led liberal approach, which the United States
continued to promote vigorously when its moment of hegemony arrived.
Although liberalism embraces and promotes globalisation, fifteen years of American hege-
mony have revealed many governance challenges for which recitation and application of
tenets of liberal ideology (or any ideology for that matter) have not proved sufficient. Glob-
alisation creates increasingly complex and difficult contexts with respect to key governance
functions any society faces: security, economic prosperity, political and economic develop-
ment, and the protection of human dignity. The 2 1St century confronts all states with the
hard challenges of applied ideology-the governance nuts-and-bolts of making the liberal
framework work effectively inside and among states in an environment of accelerating, hard-
to-control globalisation. Countries unable or unwilling to confront the difficult governance
tasks the 21" century presents may find themselves approaching a state of endemic crisis,
increasing dependency, and vulnerability to the wrath of disenchanted and disenfranchised
people who can use globalisation themselves as a multiplier of their anger and despera-
tion.23 The transition from this unfortunate condition to the category of "failed state" may
represent an increasingly small step in the 21 t century.
The 2 1 st century may well be remembered as the Asian century because Asia may become
the most important laboratory of the next phase of governance in world affairs. Unlike the
United States and most of the European Union, Asia has not reached the kind of eco-
nomic and political integration that provides the United States and the European Union
with deeply grounded foundations for their continental-wide politics, economics and cul-
tures. The American and European levels of economic and political integration provide
them with robust (if not always adequate) capabilities with which to confront the forces
globalisation unleashes. Transformative changes in the nature of governance undertaken
by the United States and the European Union are not, therefore, likely to characterise inter-
national relations in the 21 st century. Instead, the 21 st century may well tell the tale of how
Asian countries individually and collectively address entrenched and emerging political,
economic, technological and social problems through existing or newly created governance
mechanisms. How Asia governs its problems will be of urgent concern for the world given
Asia's rise in importance in world politics. Governance in Asia has become a "global public
good".
Unlike the Middle East and Africa, Asia has reached a level of connectivity with the
processes of globalisation such that this region is on the cutting edge of, and now often
leading, the whirlwind economic and technological changes buffeting all states, governments
and peoples. Most countries in the Middle East and Africa lag behind Asian states in their
abilities to govern effectively in the globalised world of the early 21" century. Experts
23 Al-Qaida, the global terrorist network, perhaps serves as a precursor of what may develop more frequently in
the 21" century if hard governance challenges are not successfully managed.
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on the Arab world have lamented the backwardness of their societies, 24 and the US effort
to democratise the Middle East constitutes an "ideological inquisition" of countries in the
region. Africa's future remains bleak despite renewed efforts to focus on African poverty
and problems.2' This depressing situation means that Africa is unlikely to be on the cutting
edge of governance in world affairs in the 21" century.
Unlike South America, the speed, scale, and nature of Asia's integration with globalisation
place this region at the forefront of geopolitical developments shaping the 2l st century world
order. Although commentary sometimes identifies Brazil as a rising power, 26 nothing like
the interest in and concern about China or India accompanies discussions of Brazil's 2 1S"
century prospects. Discussion of a "South American century" is non-existent.
Asia represents, thus, a unique environment in which the next phase of governance in
international relations will unfold. Asia will be the laboratory for global governance mecha-
nisms in the 2l1s century because, of all the regions of the world, it alone combines in ample
proportions the most cutting-edge qualities of the First World and the grinding despair of
the worst of the Third World-and all conditions in between. The Asian century will not be
remembered because countries in Asia lay down the law to the rest of the world, or because
China or India becomes a hyperpower. If the 21 s" century is the Asian century, it will be
because Asia will host the next great challenges for, and experiments in, the governance of
human affairs.
B. The Concept of a "Concert of Asia"
Framing the Asian century in terms of a governance challenge for world politics creates the
need to discuss how governance of Asia's continued rise in power and prominence will be
managed. Are existing governance mechanisms sufficient for the task, or will states in Asia
and beyond need to create new institutions and arrangements to govern the power shifts
taking place? Will the creation of new institutions require an expanded use of international
law or other forms of law by Asian nations as they move to govern more effectively relations
among themselves and with non-Asian states? These, and similar, questions can only be
answered at a very general level; but even such general answers can be instructive in terms
of how an Asian century might affect the role of international law in the governance of
international relations.
I argue that the governance challenges faced in Asia's rise in international relations should
be handled strategically within a "Concert of Asia". Clearly, this idea echoes the famous
Concert of Europe that existed in the first half of the 1 9th century and also borrows from
those who previously have advocated a Concert of Asia with respect to security threats the
region might face, for example, from China's continued rise to great power status. The
Concert of Asia I have in mind, however, does not track either the Concert of Europe or
earlier proposals for a Concert of Asia.
1. Concert of Europe v. Concert of Asia
The Concert of Europe was a diplomatic mechanism through which the European great
powers attempted to manage order in Europe in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars.27
The origins and nature of the Concert of Europe make it an inappropriate model for the
24 United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities
for Future Generations (New York: United Nations, 2002).
2) The Group of 8 plans, for example, to focus on the plight of Africa at its 2005 summit in Scotland.
26 Supra note 18 at 54.
27 F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) at 213-237.
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Asian century. The Concert of Europe involved the status quo powers deciding to work
together to prevent another eruption in European affairs of the kind experienced in the
French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars. This goal involved not only main-
taining a balance of power among the great powers but also suppressing domestic political
changes that states perceived could upset order and stability in Europe.
This early 1 9 th century mechanism for governance in Europe has little relevance for the
Asia of the 21 st century. To begin with, the governance challenges prompted by Asia's rise
do not come in the aftermath of cataclysmic armed conflict of the kind that shook Europe to
its foundations after the French Revolution. Asia's increased prominence, especially in the
economic sphere, has occurred in a relatively orderly and peaceful manner, making unnec-
essary a mechanism built on intense fear of another continent-wide conflict. In addition,
the Concert of Europe was international governance by great powers only, an approach
not likely to work in the globalised and more democratic age of the 21 st century. The only
relevance of the Concert of Europe to Asia's future is that any Concert of Asia will have to
pay systematic attention to regional security issues and how regional security affects peace
and security outside Asia.
2. Concert(s) of Asia
The idea of developing a "Concert of Asia" has, in the past, focused on the need to manage
security concerns in Asia through closer and perhaps more institutionalised cooperation
and collaboration among the major powers of the region, such as China, the United States,
Japan, Russia, and South Korea.2 8 These notions of a Concert of Asia echo the "top down"
realpolitik of the Concert of Europe-get the great powers around a table, find a mutually
agreeable solution, and impose it through the exercise of superior power. This approach
requires a likemindedness among great powers that may have existed among 19th century
European monarchies emerging from the trauma of the Napoleonic wars but does not exist
among the great powers affected by developments in Asia.
Further, China and India might perceive such a concert as an attempt by status quo
powers, especially the United States, worried about their relative declines in influence to
curtail the emergence of these Asian countries as great powers. India's and China's incentive
to concert only increases as their relative power increases, a development which a security-
focused Concert of Asia might oppose because it really seeks to contain and balance the
growth of Indian and/or Chinese power.
3. Concert of Asia as laboratory for global governance
My vision of a Concert of Asia is broader and looser than the historical example of the
Concert of Europe or the various proposals for a security-focused Concert of Asia. My con-
cept of the Concert of Asia involves interdependent governance initiatives and arrangements
that handle a wide range of problems facing the Asian region. This concert would address
traditional security issues but in a manner that is more "bottom up" than "top down". The
concert should also address transnational economic, social, environmental, technological
and health issues that affect the quality of life and stability of governments in the region.
Countries in Asia have developed cooperation mechanisms that would provide founda-
tions on which to build the Concert of Asia. Important among these regional efforts are
the cooperative ventures under the umbrella of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. These organisations
28 See N. Khoo & M. L. R. Smith, "A 'Concert of Asia'?" (2001) Policy Review (No. 108), online: < http://www.
policyreview.org/AUG01/khoo print.html> (last visited 12 March 2005); and F. Fukuyama, "Re-Envisioning
Asia" (2005) 1 Foreign Affairs 75.
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have significant track records, particularly in terms of economic relations, that demonstrate
the willingness and ability of many Asian states to engage in pragmatic, results-oriented
multilateral cooperation. The Concert of Asia needs to build on what Asian countries have
already developed rather than just creating entirely new mechanisms alien to the patterns
of cooperation established in the region over many years.
29
At the same time, what Asian countries have built and refined to date will not be sufficient
to meet the challenges and responsibilities the Asian century portends. Experts often note
that modes of multilateral cooperation in Asia are more informal and non-binding than other
approaches to regional collaboration and integration (e.g., the highly formalised and law-
bound European Union). The "Asian way" concerning regional cooperative mechanisms
has reflected significant sensitivity about the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention
in the domestic affairs of other states. Such an approach to cooperation may have served
Asian countries well in the past, but as Asia continues to grow in political, economic,
technological, cultural and security importance, the conventional approach may not be
adequate. The Concert of Asia invites, then, the countries of this region to re-think their
traditional assumptions about regional and international cooperation given the importance
this region now has in world affairs.
The Concert of Asia idea is not a plea for Asian states simply to generate more interna-
tional law through the creation of more formal international institutions and adoption of
more binding treaties. More international law does not necessarily indicate that countries
are making progress in addressing their responsibilities and problems. The legal importance
of the Concert of Asia idea involves envisioning this concert producing a new governance
order for Asia that involves rules that may not always fit existing definitions of domestic,
international or transnational law.
In Van Gend en Loos, the European Court of Justice famously opined that the Treaty
of Rome had created a "new legal order in international law".30 The governance exper-
iment launched with the Treaty of Rome in Europe peacefully integrated the economies
and societies of countries that had fought savage wars against each other over the course
of centuries. The European "bottom up" approach began with the integration of coal and
steel industries and developed into the grand, still expanding European Union, which now
stands on the verge of having its own constitution31-a fitting capstone to a peace project
built meticulously through formal law and institutions.
Seeing the Concert of Asia as a laboratory of global governance in the 2l1s century involves
believing that Asian nations have an opportunity to create their own new legal order unlike
anything seen before, that has regional effectiveness and universal value and appeal as a
model for other countries and regions. A successful Concert of Asia will not necessarily
require creation and implementation of the kind of transnational law that characterises the
European Union. Nor would a successful Concert of Asia have to involve the adoption of
formal treaty law at every step. As a laboratory, the Concert of Asia can experiment with
legal and non-legal approaches to the hard governance tasks of applied ideology required
in the complex environment of 21" century globalisation. To believe, however, that status
quo assumptions and approaches can meet the burdens and challenges that will be Asia's in
the 21 s" century would constitute unwarranted, and irresponsible, complacency.
29 One Japanese scholar has observed that the work of ASEAN and APEC is not widely known or studied by
most international lawyers. See Kazuhiro Nakatani, "Developing a Realistic International Law Curricula for
the New Asia: A Personal View" (2001) 5 S.J.I.C.L. 405 at 409. He argues that "there are few, if any, writings
by international lawyers on these crucially important entities [ASEAN and APEC]. This is in contrast with
the huge number of publications on the European Union. I do not consider that the EU presents the only
model for regional integration. ASEAN and APEC are alternative models and they can influence the study and
development of the law of international organizations".
30 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie (26/62) [1963] C.M.R. 105 at 129.
31 See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 47 0. J. C310 (16 December 2004).
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D. The Concert of Asia and Core Governance Functions
The dangers of complacency in Asia can be illustrated by looking at the magnitude of the
governance challenges confronting countries in Asia. In the 21" century, Asian countries
will have to address at least four core governance functions for the region: (1) the provision
of security, (2) the continuation of economic growth, (3) the political and economic devel-
opment of underdeveloped and vulnerable populations and countries and (4) the protection
and promotion of human dignity. Although existing mechanisms of multilateral cooperation
may relate to these functions currently, the growth in the importance of Asia in international
politics magnifies both the scope and the difficulty of these governance functions.
In terms of security, the earlier discussion of proposals for a security-based Concert of Asia
or a permanent multilateral organisation for regional peace and security revealed disquiet
that exists among experts about the security problems brewing in Asia and the inadequacy
of existing security arrangements and mechanisms to address them. These problems include
long-standing security issues, such as the status of Taiwan, North Korea's nuclear ambitions,
Japanese interest in increasing its military capabilities, and the continued military presence
of the United States in the region. The continued growth in Chinese political, economic and
military power adds a new and potentially troubling dimension to these traditional security
concerns, as well as creating new security worries among countries inside and outside Asia.
In addition to managing China's rise as a great power, Asian security tasks include addressing
the threats of terrorism and organised crime. Whether Asia's existing security arrangements,
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and various bilateral and regional arrangements or
agreements, provide suitable governance platforms for managing the power shift underway
in the region would be a question of high priority for the Concert of Asia.
Predictions that globalisation will increasingly be less Americanised and more Asianised
because of Asia's economic prowess suggest that the Concert of Asia would inherit a vibrant
regional economic dynamic that is increasingly making its importance felt around the world.
Regional governance mechanisms, such as ASEAN and APEC, combined with the region's
participation in multilateral economic ventures, such as the World Trade Organization,
and the embracing of bilateral strategies would provide the Concert of Asia with robust
levels of intergovernmental cooperation on economic matters. Memories of the painful
Asian financial crisis in 1997, worries about the economic transformations being wrought
by China's and India's respective emergences as global economic engines, economic setbacks
caused by outbreaks of infectious diseases (SARS in 2003 and avian influenza in 2004-05)
and energy supply vulnerabilities leave little room for complacency about governance of
economic growth in Asia in the 21" century.
Although Asia is increasingly home to some of the most cutting-edge technological devel-
opments in globalisation, the region remains home to high levels of poverty and economic
inequality, both within countries and among Asian states. The Concert of Asia would have
to concern itself systematically with governance issues involving the political and economic
development of impoverished and vulnerable populations and countries. Poverty, neglect,
and despair are breeding grounds for violence that may coalesce around alternative, rad-
ical ideologies that could challenge the stability of individual governments or the region
itself. Echoes of the Concert of Europe's fears about radical domestic changes upsetting the
European balance of power can be heard, but the Concert of Asia's approach to these prob-
lems should be proactive and preventive instead of fearful and reactionary. Asia's increasing
wealth garnered by its economic success will also increase demands by other parts of the
world for Asia to contribute to their political and economic development.
Finally, the triumph of ideology in international law in the 2 0 th century has placed human
dignity at the forefront in terms of international governance. Other regions, such as Europe,
the Americas and Africa, have developed, with different levels of success, regional human
rights systems. The development of a regional human rights approach in Asia has been slow,
(2005)
THE ASIAN CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
reflecting the preference of Asian nations not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs.
The protection and promotion of human dignity would be an important governance func-
tion of the Concert of Asia, although the Concert does not necessarily have to respond by
constructing a regional human rights treaty-system for Asia modelled on existing interna-
tional human rights approaches. Continued subordination of the human dignity agenda
to the interests of 1 9 th century concepts of sovereignty will not, however, advance Asia's
ability to shoulder the governance burdens its growing wealth, status and power create.
This brief discussion of the Concert of Asia concept and the core governance functions
important to the region provides a glimpse of the seriousness and magnitude of the challenges
facing Asia in the 21" century. How Asian countries respond to these challenges will
have significant implications for international law because effective responses will require
increasing use of traditional international law and innovative approaches to governance that
may not fit conventional categories of domestic and international law. The Concert of Asia
could well be the cutting-edge laboratory for the next generation of international law, which
would carry forward the universalisation of the 1 9 th century and the triumph of ideology
in the 2 0 th century but would evolve its own unique characteristics reflecting the exigencies
and hopes of an interconnected 21 s century humanity.
V. CONCLUSION
In terms of time, centuries happen. In terms of history, centuries are made. The mere
passage of time will not make the 21s' century the Asian century in the history of international
relations and international law. Enough indicators now point to "Asia rising", such that one
can sense a historical moment for this region dawning. Such moments are simultaneously
opportunities and burdens because those thrust into these "tipping points" of history cannot
escape the responsibilities created and must, for better or worse, shape the future. At these
moments, what futures are imaginable and possible?
Europe and the United States have variously confronted their moments at tipping points
in history. In the 1 9 th century, Europe universalised international law as a governance
mechanism and created the Westphalian civilisation; and this governance breakthrough
remains the basic architecture of human affairs to this day. In the 2 0 th century, the United
States launched the "ideological inquisition" of international law and ultimately prevailed
in it, giving Westphalian civilisation an over-arching ideology through which to govern
itself. Europe and the United States seized their historical moments and imagined and built
governance constructs that previously did not exist but that survived the tumult of the
previous century.
The rise of Asia presents the countries of this region with their "tipping point" test
of governance imagination and skill. The test for the 21s century is whether the liberal,
Westphalian civilisation can effectively and justly manage globalisation in a world burdened
by entrenched inequalities and transnational threats to human well-being and environmental
sustainability. How countries approach and respond to this governance test will determine
the next stage of the historical development of international law as an instrument in human
governance. As argued earlier, Asia constitutes the region where this test now finds its most
important application. This test is now Asia's burden and opportunity.
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